- See also Circumstantial luck
- This form of luck concerns the kind of person you are—your innate character, temperament, and capacities. These are traits that are largely, if not entirely, determined by factors beyond our control, such as genetics, upbringing, and environment. For example, a person may be naturally courageous or cowardly, intelligent or slow-witted. Constitutive luck points out that we often praise or blame people for these character traits and the actions that stem from them, despite the fact that individuals did not choose their fundamental dispositions.
Gemini explanation
Of course. Let’s explore constitutive luck in more detail.
Constitutive luck is arguably the most personal and fundamental of Nagel’s four types. It refers to the luck of being the kind of person you are. This includes your innate personality, character traits, natural talents, physical capabilities, and inclinations—the very “constitution” of your self. These are features that are largely, if not entirely, determined by factors beyond your control, such as your genes, upbringing, and early environmental influences.
The Core Idea
The central issue of constitutive luck is this: we praise and blame people for their character, yet people do not choose their character.
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We praise someone for being naturally compassionate, courageous, or quick-witted.
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We blame someone for being inherently selfish, lazy, cowardly, or envious.
However, if these traits are the product of one’s genetic lottery and upbringing, then the person being praised or blamed is lucky or unlucky to have them. This creates a deep conflict with the principle that moral responsibility should only apply to what we can control.
Key Aspects of Constitutive Luck
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Innate Temperament and Personality: Some people are born with a sunny disposition, while others are naturally more melancholic or irritable. A person who is naturally short-tempered may have to struggle constantly against anger in situations where a more placid person feels no such impulse. Is the short-tempered person more blameworthy when they finally snap, given that their struggle was so much harder due to factors they didn’t choose?
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Natural Talents and Capacities: Intelligence, artistic ability, and physical coordination are distributed by a lottery of nature and nurture. A person with a brilliant mind might easily succeed in a demanding field, earning praise for their achievements. Someone with a learning disability has to work immensely harder to achieve much less and may be judged as a failure. Their starting points are a matter of luck.
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Moral Character: This is the most crucial aspect. Nagel asks us to consider virtues and vices. Is envy a moral failing for which someone should be blamed? What if that person’s envy stems from deep-seated insecurities instilled by a difficult childhood combined with a genetic predisposition towards anxiety? While they are responsible for their envious actions, constitutive luck questions whether they are equally responsible for being the kind of person who feels envy so strongly in the first place.
The Connection to Other Types of Luck
Constitutive luck can be seen as the foundation for the other types of moral luck. The kind of person you are (constitutive luck) will heavily influence:
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How you react in a given situation (circumstantial luck). A brave person and a cowardly person will act differently if they see a house on fire.
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The sorts of actions you will undertake, which then become subject to resultant luck. A person with poor impulse control (constitutive luck) is more likely to drive drunk, exposing them to the chance of causing a fatal accident.
Why It’s a “Problem”
Constitutive luck is deeply unsettling because it attacks the very agent we aim to judge. When we praise or blame someone, we are not just judging a single action in isolation; we are judging the person who performed it. But if that person’s core character is itself a matter of luck, our entire system of moral assessment seems to be built on a foundation of sand.
Nagel’s point isn’t that we should stop holding people responsible. Rather, he wants to show that our practice of doing so is paradoxical. We look at a person’s actions and see them as a reflection of their “true self,” but constitutive luck reveals that this self is a contingent and arbitrary product of the world, much more than we like to admit. It reveals a gap between our ordinary moral judgements and the conditions that would be required to truly justify them.